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NOTES ON RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW.-Misconduct of Jurors.--Conduct of
sheriff and juror riding to a dance in the former's automobile
after adjournment of court, before the close of the prosecuting
attorney's argument, held, to require that the verdict
be set aside and a new trial granted for the reason that the juror
was entertained and accepted courtesies of the prevailing party.
Lavalley v. State. (Wisconsin, 1925) 205 N. W. 412. The same
conclusion was reached where a deputy prosecuting attorney volunteered to deliver a message for a juror to the latter's family. Hutchins v. State (Ind.) 39 N. E. 243. When, in the hot weather while
a trial was in progress, a jury, in charge of baliffs, after all
the testimony had been submitted and before argument began, was
taken to the private grounds of counsel assisting the state's attorney
where they sat in the cool breezes and enjoyed the comforts of his
shady lawn for over an hour it was held that such acceptance of
comforts amounted to misconduct on the part of the jurors as would
require reversal. Although neither the counsel nor his family were
on the premises the circumstances were such that the jury must
have known that they were accepting his hospitality. State v. Ferguson. (S. D.) 204 N. W. 652. It is also reversible error for some
of the jurymen to become intoxicated, but the mere drinking of a
glass of liquor is not grave misconduct. Mikeska v. State. (Tex.
Cr. App.) 181 S. W. 1127. And when jurors in a criminal case read
local newspapers commenting on the trial it requires a setting aside
of the verdict, even though the jurors swear that they were not influenced thereby in reaching a conclusion. Stare v. Caine. (Ia.)
111 N. W. 443. It is the duty of officers having custody of a jury
in a felony case to keep them at all times entirely removed from the
company of others. People v. Duncan. (Ill.) 103 N.:E. 1043.
An impartial jury, free from all outside or improper influences is
necessary to an impartial trial. Owens v. State. (Fla.) 67 So. 39,
Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 252.
FOOD. Warranty Implied that Food is Wholesome-Appellee, having eaten a minced chicken sandwich which she alleged
was unwholesome and caused ptomaine poisoning, brought an
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action against appellant restaurant proprietor to recover damages for breach of an implied warranty that the food was wholesome and fit for immediate consumption. Appellant contended
that at law he was neither an insurer of the wholesomeness of
food served nor within the law of sales relating to implied warranties. Held, an order of food for immediate consumption by a
customer and payment therefor constitutes a sale and there is an implied warranty that it is wholesome and free from any deleterious
substances, and, if food proves to be otherwise, seller is liable for
resulting damage. Heise v. Gillette. (Ind. App. 1925) 149 N.
E. 182. This is in accord with the great weight of authority, and the
rule applies irrespective of seller's knowledge of defects in the food.
35 Cyc. 407. It is required in some jurisdictions that want of reasonable care in preparation and serving must be shown. Valeri v.
Pullman Co. (U. S. Dist. Ct., N. Y.) 218 Fed. 519; Kenney v.
Wong Len. (N. H.) 128 Atl. 343.
HIGHWAYS.-A taxpayer cannot enjoin reconstruction of
a highway, funds for which have been provided, where there is
no allegation or proof showing that he will sustain special injury not sustained by the general public. DeNeffe v. Duby. (Ore.)
239 Pac. 109.
INSURANCE.-Meaning of "Theft".-Where an owner of
an automobile covered by a policy indemnifying him against loss
by "theft, robbery and pilferage" executed a contract of sale for
said automobile and transferred title and possession thereof to
vendee who paid the vendor with a forged check, held, such does
not constitute a "theft" within the terms of the policy--"theft" being
construed in its usual and ordinary meaning. Royal Ins. Co. v. Jack.
(Ohio) 148 N. E. 923.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.-Liability for Maintaining Nuisance.-Where a municipality assumes control and management of a sewer in a public street and said sewer becomes
clogged and floods premises of abutting owners, 'held, such function
is of a ministerial nature and city is guilty of maintaining a nuisance
for which it is liable to property owners injured thereby. City of
Portsmouthv. Mitchell Mfg. Co., (Ohio) 148 N. E. 846.NEGLIGENCE.-Attractive Nuisance.-In an action for
death of children caused by a cave-in of a sand wall in an excavation on defendant's premises in the uptown district where
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neighborhood children gathered to play, held, the landowner is liable for injury under the doctrine of attractive nuisance, even
though the cave-in was contributed to, or proximately causedby the children digging cubby holes there in the course of play.
Baxter v. Park. (S. D. 1925) 205 N. W. 75. Dillon, J., in a strong
dissenting opinion argued that liability should not be imposed
upon a landowner when, as in this case, the digging of the cubby
holes by the children proximately caused the disaster.
In an
able discussion he attempts to distinguish the principal case
from the "Turntable Cases", and goes on to say, "If we impose
upon the landowner a duty of keeping his premises safe for all
who might trespass thereon, we may deprive him of the beneficial use of those premises. I think the rule which exonerates
a landowner from liability for injuries received, through no
fault of his, by persons trespassing upon his premises should be
adopted in this case." It has been upheld by respectable authority, and is probably the better rule, that excavations and pits,
like bodies of water, do not come within the doctrine as laid
down in the "Turntable Cases". Zagar v. U. P. Ry. (Kans.) 214
P. 107; Kotowski v. Taylor (Del. Super.) 114 Atl. g61; Ratte v.
,Dawson (Minn.) 52 N. W. 965. Also, it has been held by a series
of decisions that one making an excavation on his land is not bound
so to guard it as to prevent injury to children coming thereon, without invitation, induced by the alluring attractiveness of the excavation and its surroundings; Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Young (Ga. App.)
93 S. E. 29; Ratte v. Dawson, supra; Talty v. City of Atlantic (Ia.)
60 N. W. 516. See Gillespie v. McGowan (Pa.) 45 Am. Rep. 365.
"Although there is some authority to the contrary, the weight of
authority is to the effect that no duty rests upon the owner of land
to protect children from the danger of excavations thereon."-29
Cyc. 464. Nor is a landowner guilty of negligence when he could
not reasonably have anticipated that trespassing children would dig
into the walls causing them to fall, Alvis Adn's. v. Weaver (Ky.)
266 S. W. 88; Talty v. Atlantic (supra); and when the parents fail
to exercise any control over their activities or ascertaining their playground, such indifference may constitute negligence which will prevent recovery. Kotowski v. Taylor, supra. It is also stated that
no liability is imposed upon a landowner if the excavation is so situated at a reasonable distance from a highway that in order to reach
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it a trespass must be committed. Gillespie v. McGowan, (supra.)
The rule in Texas is that when a landowner has knowledge, or is
charged with knowing, that an excavation on his premises is likely
to cave in, and that said excavation does attract children who are actually allured there to play, such inducement amounts to an implied
invitation, and he owes a duty to protect and guard them. Realty
Co. v. Mather. (Tex. Civ. App.) 207 S. W. 121.
NEGLIGENCE.-Imputed Negligence of Automobile Driver.-Whether Extended to Passenger. Action against railroad
company for the death of plaintiff's minor son who was riding as
a guest in the rear seat of an automobile owned and operated by a
friend, whose negligence concurred with the negligence of the
railroad company in causing the accident. Held, the negligence of
the automobile driver cannot be imputed to the plaintiff's decedent,
a minor. June v. Grand Trunk Ry., (Mich., 1925) 205 N. W. 181.
It has long been the law in Michigan that the negligence of the
driver is imputable to an adult companion-the rule being founded on
the fiction that .the driver acts as agent to whom the guest entrusts
his safety. Muller v. Owosso, (Mich.) 58 N. W. 663; West v. Detroit Terminal Co., 201 N. W. 935. The great weight of authority, however, is that the negligence of the driver cannot be imputed
to a passenger who has no control or authority over the driver, and
this rule obtains in very recent decisions. St. Mary's Acidemy v.
Solomon, (Colo.) 238 Pac. 22; Gottschalk v. Wells, (Mo.) 274 S.
W. 399; Tower v. Camp, (Conn.) 130 Atl. 86; Poynter v. Townsend, (Del. Sup.) 130 At1. 678; Phillips v. Boston-Maine Ry., (N.
H.) 128 Atl. 809; Boyd, Higgins, Goforth v Malone., (Va.) 128
S. E. 259; Nutt v. Pa. Ry., (Pa.) 126 At1. 803.
In Prideauxv. MineralPoint (28 Am. Rep. 558) the Wisconsin
court held that the driver of a private conveyance is the agent of
the person in such conveyance, so that his negligence, contributing
to the injury, will defeat the action brought by one of his passengers;
but the Prideaux case has been overruled in Wisconsin in Reiter v.
Gt4ober in 1921 (181 N. W. 739). It is stated in the opinion, "we not
only refuse to so extend- the rule of Prideaux v. Mineral Point, insofar as it imputes the negligence of the driver of a private vehicle
to an occupant therein, but we take this occasion to expressly overrule it. The doctrine was founded upon the idea that the occupant voluntarily made the driver his agent for the trip by accept-
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ing a ride with him; that he entrusted his safety to him, and
.thereby became so identified with him that the driver's negligence became his own. While there is some ethical ground for
this idea, it has never received judicial approval, and it has been
pointed out that it rests upon no sound legal basis either as to
agency or identity; the driver as well as the third party becomes a tortfeasor toward the occupant when he is injured by
their joint negligence, and he can pursue either or both."
And in another Wisconsin case, Brubaker v. Iowa.County, 183
N. W. 690, 18 A. L. R. 303, it was held that where the wife of the
driver was injured as the result of running into a culvert, the contributory negligence of the husband cannot be imputed to her. The
court, indeed, declared that "much advice and many suggestions
are not conductive to the best management of the car ;" although
"if the occupant sees the driver is driving at an excessive rate
of speed, or in violation of the law, reasonable care would require
that the passenger protest." Here the driver was not traveling
at an excessive rate of speed, nor in clear violation of the law,
and the plaintiff recovered.
Merely directing the driver as to the route or warning him
of danger does not amount to control; but in order to create an
imputation of negligence the guest must assume practically exclusive supervision and direction of the vehicle. Clark v.Missouri
and Pacific Ry., (Kas.) 224 Pac. 920; Duval z. Atlantic City Ry.
(N. C.) 46 S. E. 750. A guest must use ordinary and reasonable
care for his own safety under the circumstances or be open to a
charge of contributory negligence. Parramore v. Denver and Rio
Grande Ry., 5 Fed. (2nd) 912; and in many jurisdictions an invitee
owes a duty to look, listen and act with prudence. Noble v.Chicago,
Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry., 298 Fed. 381. The negligence of a
husband cannot be imputed to his wife, using ordinary care, unless
they are joint owners, or are bound upon a joint journey for mutual
benefit or pleasure. Pettitv. Kansas City, (Mo.App.)267 S. W. 954;
Gaffney v. City of Dixon, 157 III. App. 589; Brubaker v. Iowa
County, supra; nor can the negligence of a parent or guardian be
imputed to a child. Raskin v. Sioux City, (Ia.) 200 N. W. 333.
And, according to the preponderance of authorities, a carrier's negligence cannot be imputed to a passenger for hire. Dumas v. Ward,
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(Mass.) 146 N. E. 709; Gulf and S. I. Ry. v. Carlson, (Miss.) 102
So. 168; Union Traction Co. v. Gaunt, (Ind.) 135 N. E. 486.
NEGLIGENCE.-Operator of Automobile Owes Guest
Duty to Use Reasonable Care.-Appellant made a trip with appellee in the latter's automobile and while on the journey the appellee drove the car at such excessive and careless rate of speed
that he lost control of the vehicle and ran off the road into a
ravine, causing injury to appellant. Held, the -operator of an automobile owes an invited guest a duty to use reasonable care and
although the guest is self-invited, or a guest at sufferance, the
owner and driver must use the same degree of care so as not to
injure him. The law exacts of him who puts a force in motion
that he shall control it with skill and care proportional to the
danger created, and the rule applies as well to a guest at sufferance as to a guest by invitation. Munson v. Rupker. (Ind. App.
1925) 148 N. E. 169.) The authorities, generally, concede that a
driver of an automobile owes an invited guest a duty to use reasonable in the operation of the vehicle. Glick v. Baer (Wisc. )201
N. W. 752; Alley v. Wall. (Mo. App.), 272 S. W. 99; Paiewonsky
v. Joffe (N. J.) 129 Atl. 142; but whether the same degree of care is
required toward a self-invited guest is a disputed proposition. The
principal case casts its favor toward the rule which requires the
same degree of care toward a guest at sufferance. This rule is
supported by other decisions, also. Grabaw v. Pudwill. (N. D.)
178 N. W. 124; Christie v. Mitchell (W. Va.) 116 S. E. 715. Some
jurisdictions maintain that wanton or gross and wilful negligence
must be shovwn to recover by an invitee. Massaletti v.
Fitzroy (Mass.) 118 N. E. 168, L. R. A. Ann. Cas. 1918B 1088.
But the present day tendency is to the effect that anything less than
reasonable care is culpable negligence such as will impose liability.
Rappaportv. Stockdale (Minn.) 199 N. W. 513.
REAL PROPERTY.-Equitable Title as Basis for Action
of Trespass.-Will an equitable title to a parcel of land support
an action for trespass? That trespass is a possessory action is elemental knowledge. The possession sufficient to maintain this action
may be either actual or constructive. A party in actual possession may successfully bring an action against a mere wrongdoer who can show no better title or right of possession. We
presume a state of facts in which the plaintiff has equitable title
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to certain realty. We further presume that the plaintiff is not
in possession of the particular lands. The question that presents itself upon this set of facts is this: ' Maythe equitable title
holder maintain trespass to the realty in contemplation? The
point may be reiterated that neither legal nor equitable title is of consequence when the action is based upon actual possession. 'The
courts are unanimous in declaring that title becomes immaterial
when the plaintiff alleges- possession. Now the case under our
consideration involves unoccupied premises. Again the decisions
are uniform in holding that the legal title holder may succeed
in an action of trespass on unoccupied lands. How about the
equitable title holder? Has the equitable title the efficacy of
the legal title? Thus far in our dnalysis the principles of law
have been decided without conflict among the authorities. However, the courts in adjudicating Upon the immediate query have
spoken in conflicting terms.
In McMilla.n v..Hafley (4 N. C. 89), the court in discussing
sufficiency of an equitable title to support the action of trespass
when the party claiming was not in possession, said: "The plaintiff in such an action must have either actual or constructive possession and title at law is essential to constructive possession."
In other words, this case holds that the equitable title will not
draw to itself the constructive possession so as to enable the one
holding such title to maintain an action for trespass.
Before going any further it should be noted that this case
represents the minority ruling.
The great majority of American cases stand in opposition
to the North Carolina cases, and it may be said that these cases
are established upon what seems to be a more liberal principle of
justice. The leading case representing the weight of authority
is the North Dakota case of Jay v. Russell, (47 L. R. A. 637). In
that decision the court laid down the rule that "the equitable
,title holder of unoccupied lands may maintain the action of tkespass as against a trespasser, as one who has the entire ownership
of lands, legal and equitable."
All the decisions affirming this principle of law emphatically
state thait such an equitable title must be reducible to a legal title;
otherwise the action will fail.
An illustrati6n will serve best to help reap the benefit of
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such principles governing equitable titles.
Accepting the same facts as stated in the above case (Jay v.
Rvw.sell) a bona fide purchaser will prevail as against a party holding equitable title in such land conveyed by the vendor. Since
the equitable title holder could not reduce such rights to legal
title he could not maintain trespass to the property in the hands
of the bona fide purchaser. But it would be otherwise if the
vendor agreed to convey to the vendee and in such agreement
the vendor destroyed an unrecorded deed and agreed with the
vendee that the latter should get a deed froth the original grantor. Such an agreement was clearly void, but the vendee had
an equitable title that was reducible to a legal title. Any case
involving these facts would, under the weight of authority, fall
within the purview of the principle that equitable title may support an action for trespass.
These are the facts of the case cited to represent the better
rule and the molern tendency. Jay v. Russell, supra. Accord, 14
Ind. App. 428; 39 N. 3. 541; 43 N. E. 46; 75 N. W. 262, 47 L. R.
A. 637. Contra,2 West L. Month 125; 2 Ohio Dec. (Repritit) 233.
Marc A.- Fiehrer.
TRIAL.-Conduct of Counsel Suggesting the Real Party
Plaintiff.-Action was brought against the city of Everett, Washington, for the death of one McSweyn, who, it was claimed, died
of typhoid fever resulting from drinking city water alleged to
have been contaminated by a defective installation of a by-pass
connecting the privately owned fire protection system of the
Eclipse Mill Company. The alleged misconduct of the city attorney consisted of repeated suggestions to the jury that the Eclipse
Company was aiding the prosecution in order to avoid its own
liability; that the milling company was a million dollar corporation;
and that the case at bar was a key-case which would affect many
other suits arising out of the same state of facts and at the time
pending decision. Held, such conduct is reversible error as denying
plaintiff a fair and impartial trial, notvithstanding the action of the
court in admonishing the -jury to disregard the remarks so made.
McSweyn v. City of "Everett (Wash. 1925) 239 Pac. 205. Statements that an insurance company is real partt ih interest was deemed reversible error notwithstanding action of. court in directing jury

64
to disregard it.
S. W. 535.
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City of Austin v. Gress.

(Tex. Civ. App.) 156

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.-A promise to allow purchaser credit for past gratuitbus services in looking after vendor's interest and for favors shown, held an insufficient cohsideration in support of a land, contract. Underwood v. Hogg, (Texas)
261 S. W. 556.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.-Restrictions on Use of
Land.-A provision in an installment contract for sale of a lot,
that the property should not be used or occupied by any person
who was not of the white or Caucasian race held valid,-it being a
restraint on itse of property, and not on alienation. Jawss Investment Co. v. Walden, (Calif.) 239 P. 34.
W. L. T.

